Does risk aversion lead to softer or fiercer competition? To give a complete answer, I provide a framework that can accommodate a wide range of alternative assumptions regarding the nature of competition and types of uncertainty. I show how more risk aversion will influence a firm's best response strategies, and that competition is unambiguously softer only in case of marginal cost uncertainty. In contrast to risk neutrality, the best response strategies depend on the level of fixed costs. This fact is extended to cover strategic investment models, and to analyse the importance of accumulated profits. I conclude by a discussion of how it is possible to test for risk-averse behaviour in oligopoly by conditioning on the type of uncertainty.
Introduction
A standard assumption in oligopoly theory is that firms are risk-neutral. However, there are several reasons for why firms may act as if they were risk-averse. Some of the factors that can be invoked are non-diversified owners, liquidity constraints, costly financial distress, and nonlinear tax systems. And even if owners themselves wish to maximise expected profits, delegation of control to a risk-averse manager, whose payment is linked to firm performance, may cause the firm to behave in a risk-averse manner. Empirically, the reluctance to bear risk is evidenced by the extent of corporate hedging activity (see e.g. Géczy et al., 1997 , Tufano, 1996 , and Nance et al., 1993 . In spite of this, surprisingly little work has focused on the effects of risk aversion on competition. In particular, there has been very little effort spent on trying to derive empirically testable predictions regarding the effects of risk aversion on competition.
Altering the assumption of risk-neutrality has several implications for the product market competition. Early works examined perfect competition and monopoly settings.
Pioneering analyses by Baron (1970) and Sandmo (1971) show how increased uncertainty about price lowers the quantity produced in perfectly competitive markets. In a monopoly framework, Baron (1971) and Leland (1972) derived similar results. Some questions that been addressed in an oligopoly framework include price leadership (Holthausen, 1979) ; information sharing (Hviid, 1989, and Hughes, 1993) ; product differentiation (Tessiotore, 1994) ; the Bertrand paradox (Wambach, 1999) ; locational choice (Mai et al., 1993) ; and equilibrium market structure (Appelbaum and Katz, 1986, and Haruna, 1996) .
Other studies have considered how the presence of futures and forwards markets may influence competition (Eldor and Zilcha, 1990, and Kao, 1997) , or the effects of hedging strategies and investment (Froot et al., 1993) . Common to previous works is that they have employed specific assumptions on the nature of competition and uncertainty (e.g.
Cournot competition with demand uncertainty). It is widely accepted, however, that many predictions from oligopoly models are sensitive to the fine details (often very difficult, if not impossible, to observe in practice) and it therefore seems appropriate to ask whether some results can be empirically validated.
In this paper I present a general framework to study the strategy choice of risk-averse firms. I consider how the nature of competition interacts with the type of uncertainty firms meet, which is found to be crucial in deriving predictions on the intensity of competition between risk-averse firms. The key assumption that I need is that profits and marginal profits are monotone in the realisation of uncertainty over the relevant set of strategies; a property that is satisfied by most common forms of uncertainty and profit functions. Given that uncertainty conforms to this, no distributional assumptions are made other than a bounded support.
The key intuition behind the effects of risk aversion is that firms gives relatively greater weight to realisations where profits are low. Its best response strategies are therefore geared towards relatively good performance in low profit states. For example, profits are low in states where marginal costs are high. In order to limit exposure to these realisations the risk-averse firm wishes to restrict output. This corresponds to low best response quantities, or high best response prices. With demand uncertainty, profits are low in states where demand is low. The risk-averse firm can insure against these cases by best response strategies that perform well in low demand states. Such strategies will involve low quantities, or low prices.
An important result is that competition will be unambiguously softer only with marginal cost uncertainty. With demand uncertainty, risk aversion makes quantity competition softer but price competition fiercer.
In contrast to previous works on risk-averse oligopolies I allow for decreasing absolute risk aversion. If the objective function has this property then fixed costs influence the bestresponse strategies by increasing risk aversion. I extend this logic to analyse the effectiveness of strategic investments in capacity, and the importance of accumulated profits. Further, I examine to what extent more risk influences the best response functions. The paper concludes with remarks on available evidence, and suggests empirical tests for strategic effects of risk aversion.
At this point, I wish to emphasize that although the presentation refers to situations where uncertainty is about demand/costs conditions and firms use prices/quantities as their strategic variables, the framework can accommodate many different situations where riskaverse firms compete. In fact, much of the same intuition carries over to cases where riskaverse firms are choosing among risky strategies such as R&D programmes, advertising campaigns, and capacity investments. outsiders (e.g., ownership structure, degree of diversification, and financial situation).
The model
To ensure that a unique stable Nash equilibrium (NE) exists I will assume that
, (see Dixit, 1986 
V
. Although I will informally refer to the strategies as "quantities" and "prices" for strategic substitutes and strategic complements, respectively, the framework applies equally well to other strategic choices (e.g., R&D and advertising expenditures, and capacity investments). 3
To give the intuition of how risk aversion influences firm i's strategy choice it is useful to rewrite (1), by applying the property
The denominator in the second term is positive, and clearly if firm i is risk-neutral then the covariance term is zero (the marginal utility is constant, and thereby independent of marginal profits). With decreasing marginal utility, in contrast, higher profits yield lower marginal utilities. The question is therefore how profits and marginal profits are related. the correlation between profits and marginal profits is positive, then a quantity (price) setting risk-averse monopolist sets a lower quantity (price) than a risk-neutral counterpart. On the other hand, if the correlation is negative then the risk-averse monopolist sets a higher price or a higher quantity. This is essentially the result of Baron (1971) . In the next section it will be shown how this carries over to different oligopoly settings.
Competition among risk-averse firms

The effects of risk aversion on prices and quantities
The first issue to examine is how firm i's risk aversion influences its strategy choice, holding firm j's risk aversion constant. To do so, define a new utility function,
where G is a positive, increasing, and concave function ( 0 > (1')
The corresponding best-response strategy, denoted ) ( Figure 1A , the iso-profit function of firm i does not have an extreme point at any of the Nash equilibria (the iso-utility functions would).
[FIGURES 1A AND 1B ABOUT HERE]
In Appendix 1, I make a specific distributional assumption, namely that profits and marginal profits are approximately normally distributed. This allows the first-order condition
(1) to be formulated in terms of the expected marginal profit, the Arrow-Pratt measure of global absolute risk aversion, and the correlation coefficient between profits and marginal profits.
Illustration of the correlation between profits and marginal profits
Can anything be said about the sign of 
with corresponding marginal profits Table 1 are easily verified. Table 1 . Correlation between profit and marginal profit. 
Intuition and effects on expected price-cost margins
Proposition 1 and Table 1 suggest a simple intuition for the risk-averse firm's strategy choice.
The risk-averse firm puts relatively greater weight on realisations where profits are low.
Under cost uncertainty, the sign of the correlation between profits and marginal profits, is dependent on whether firms set quantities or prices, and best-response quantities are low, and best-response prices are high. The intuition is that a high price, or a low quantity, protects the firm by restricting output in the high cost states. Under demand uncertainty (positive correlation between profit and marginal profit), low quantities and low prices are optimal in the low demand states. For this reason, more risk aversion shifts the best-response function downward.
Proposition 1 provides an immediate implication of an increase in firm i's risk aversion on its expected price-cost margin. With cost uncertainty, the price of its product in the NE will increase -irrespective of the nature of competition. This implies that its expected pricecost margin is increasing in its risk aversion. The same prediction can not be drawn for demand uncertainty, since its price in NE is lower if firms are competing in prices, but higher if competition is in quantities.
Corollary 1 can be used to determine if firm j's expected price-cost margin is also unambiguously higher under cost uncertainty. With price competition, firm j's NE price is higher, and so is its expected price-cost margin. With quantity competition, on the other hand, the issue is more involved as firm j's NE quantity is higher, which tends to counteract the effect firm i's lower NE quantity has on the price of firm j's product. A priori it is not clear which effect that dominates, and I am not aware of any general result that extends to differentiated products. However, reference to a simple argument provides the intuition for why firm j's price in NE should increase. Note that how much firm j's NE quantity increases depends on the degree of product differentiation: the greatest increase is when the two firms' products are homogenous; the smallest increases are when demands are almost independent.
For homogenous products, firm j's NE quantity will increase by less than the decrease in firm i's NE quantity (see e.g., Dixit, 1986) . It follows that the price of firm j's (and firm i's) product in NE is higher, and so is firm j's expected price-cost margin. At the other end, with completely independent demands, there is no price effect. Although this is not a rigorous proof that the expected price-cost margin of the rival rises when there is cost uncertainty, it nevertheless strongly suggests that an increase in a competitor's risk-aversion tends to have this effect. 10
So far, only a change in one firm's risk aversion has been considered. Can anything be said when both firms' risk aversion is increased, in the presence of cost uncertainty? That the answer is yes follows from the same analysis as in the preceding two paragraphs. Without repeating the argument: under cost uncertainty the expected price-cost margin for each firm is higher the more risk-averse firms are. Predictions for demand uncertainty will hinge on the nature of competition.
Fixed costs
The level of fixed costs is irrelevant for the choice of strategy in a one-shot game with riskneutral players. This, in general, does not hold for risk-averse players. In this section, I
therefore examine how best response functions depend on fixed costs.
It seems uncontroversial to assume that the absolute risk aversion, 
, an increase in firm i's fixed cost leads to a lower best-response strategy. The intuition is simple: higher fixed costs make the bad realisations even worse for a risk-averse firm. To reduce the impact of these, the risk-averse firm lowers its quantity or price, to be better adjusted in the bad realisations. For
, firm i will increase its price to limit the exposure to states with high marginal costs. The extent to which an increase in firm i's fixed costs increase its, and firm j's, expected price-cost margins follows from Section 3.1.2.
Proposition 2 corresponds to results in the early works of Baron (1970) , Sandmo (1971) and Leland (1972) for perfectly competitive and monopoly environments. It is straightforward to extend Proposition 2 to cover two forms of strategic investment models.
Strategic sunk cost investments
Proposition 2 has direct implications for the class of strategic investment models which involves an initial fixed (sunk) outlay; see Tirole (1988) for various applications. The intuition is that the investment reduces the firm's wealth, and thereby changes its risk aversion in the future.
As an illustration, in the quintessential strategic investment model of Dixit (1980) , it is assumed that an incumbent firm, faced with a potential entrant, can make a sunk investment in a cost reducing technology. By pursuing the investment it can commit to an output expansion in a second stage. Let the competition be in quantities, 0 < The only effect that the investment has for a risk-neutral firm is to increase the bestresponse quantity by lowering cost of production. To a risk-averse incumbent there is a counteracting effect, since the investment also reduces its wealth level and thereby increases its risk aversion. In Proposition 2 it was shown that this reduces its second stage best-response strategy. Hence, the cost reducing investment is less attractive to a quantity setting risk-averse incumbent. On the other hand, if competition is in prices,
, the two effects work in the same direction: lower costs of production tend to reduce its price and demand uncertainty reinforces this effect. Therefore the price setting risk-averse incumbent can achieve the same strategic effect by a smaller investment.
Finally, note that uncertainty regarding marginal costs makes the strategic investment less effective for both quantity and price competition. The reason is that higher fixed costs tend to lower quantities, or raise prices, and thereby counteract the cost reduction achieved by the investment.
Relevance of accumulated profits
Just as fixed costs influence the risk-averse best-response function so do past profits. At t=2, the risk-neutral firm j maximizes expected profits, irrespective of its period one profits. This, however, is not the case with the risk-averse firm. Its best-response function depends on the first period profit, ) , ( 
where the second term is the strategic effect. (Note that its first-order condition at t=2 is follows for quantity, and price setting firms. The quantity setting firm j will be more aggressive, in the sense that its best response-function quantity is higher, to reduce the riskaverse firm's profit. The motive is that this makes firm i more risk-averse, which leads to a lower best-response quantity at t=2. Conversely, the price setting firm j prices less aggressively, in order to meet a less risk-averse firm. In a price competition setting where
the situation is reversed. Firm j prices low in the first period to reduce the risk-averse firm's profit. This induces the risk-averse firm to set a higher price at t=2. 13
Firm specific risk and market risk
For empirical testing it is desirable to have predictions on how an increase in risk influences the risk-averse best-response function. To address this question the notion of "an increase in risk" must be defined. Let ) ( 0 x F be a cumulative density function (cdf) of a random variable 
. I will examine two ways in which firm i's payoff is more risky in the SSD sense. First, by adding a background risk, which is independent of its operating profit, to its payoff. Second, by letting the operating profit become more risky.
Background risk
Consider introducing a firm specific background risk, denoted Gollier and Pratt (1996) define risk-vulnerability such as for any unfair risk ( In the previous paragraph, the background risk was firm specific. The same argument can be repeated for "economy-wide" background risk, ẑ . This is a risk that affects both firms' payoff but is unrelated to the market where they compete. Adding this background risk to each of the two risk-averse firms' payoff will have unambiguous effects on their best response functions whenever the utility functions are risk-vulnerable/satisfy standard risk aversion.
However, whether the effect on the NE strategies is also clear-cut depends on the slopes of the best response functions. It can easily be verified that with strategic complements the effect on the NE strategies is unambiguous, whereas it is not in case of strategic substitutes. 16
Market risk
I conclude the examination of changes in risk by a treatment of the analytically more complex situation where firm i's profit function becomes more risky. This is referred to as an increase in market risk, and could be thought of as more uncertain demand, or cost conditions. There are, unfortunately, few general predictions that can be made only from the assumption that ) ( 
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There are several problems involved in comparing the best-response functions defined by (4) and (5) does not follow from ε'=ε+z, one has to define a joint function, ε'=f(ε,z), such that it does.
The conjecture is that this approach is unlikely to prove tractable. The reason is a fundamental problem, namely that ) ( To show that SSD can be sufficient to obtain predictions on the best response functions, I examine the two profit functions (I1) and (I2) from Section 3.1.1. To simplify the proofs (given in Appendix 2), I use the simplest conceivable setting, where ε'=ε+z, Ez=0, Ez|ε=0, z has only two outcomes, and ε and ε' refers to one of the parameters b 0 , b 1 , b 2 , or c. Hence, the first-order conditions are given by (4) and (5). It is easy to verify that ) (
In the most bare bones case there is no uncertainty about ε (i.e., ) ( While it is possible to extend these examples beyond the 1;2, and 2;2 space (simply by adding more ε's), a completely general treatment of SSD in oligopoly is likely to involve some strong assumptions on the profit and marginal profit functions and/or the distribution of uncertainty. 21 Nevertheless, the analysis in this section suggests that for the rather flexible class of profit functions that (I1) and (I2) represents, it is possible to say that an increase in risk translates to best response functions in a way that confirms the basic intuition.
Discussion
In the paper assumptions were made to simplify the exposition and show the key effects of risk aversion in oligopoly. It is now appropriate to discuss the robustness of the results, in particular since an objective is to derive testable implications.
In the framework, only mild restrictions were made on utility functions (such as DARA in Section 3.2 and, in addition, DAP in Section 3.3.1), and no restrictions on the distribution of the uncertainty other than a bounded support consistent with a unique stable NE. On the other hand, the assumption (A1) regarding how uncertainty enters in the profit function can be more restrictive.
The main objection is that it is unclear which profit functions and forms of uncertainty that comply with (A1), which, put simply, says that there is a strict ranking between profits It is most important to verify that conclusions hold for cost uncertainty, where it was argued that the predictions for (relatively) tangible variables (e.g., prices, quantities and expected price-cost margins) were independent of factors such as whether firms are competing in "quantities" or "prices". The intuition was that the more risk-averse firm, faced with marginal cost uncertainty, has lower best response quantities and higher best response prices (which implies low quantities), as to limit exposure to realisations where marginal costs are high. To examine if the intuition is valid, let the total variable costs be ) , ( 
. 23 More generally, for (A1) to fail, it is necessary that the uncertainty amounts to a rotation of the marginal cost curve (i.e., marginal costs must be higher for some quantities but lower for others). 24 These appear to be contrived cases, and I therefore conclude that (A1) holds for any common form of cost uncertainty.
Consider next the case of demand uncertainty, where risk aversion did not provide definite predictions (i.e., independent of unobservables) on measurable variables. Here the intuition was that a more risk-averse firm's best response quantity is lower and that its best response price is also lower, since low prices, or low quantities, perform well in states where demand is low. To analyse this more intricate case, write firm i's inverse demand and marginal demand as ) , , (
are assumed to have the same sign. With demand uncertainty, it is more difficult to rule out violations of (A1). One example is since the behaviour of risk-averse firms, even when (A1) holds, depends on whether they are assumed to set prices or quantities.
Finally, the two paragraphs above relate to another restriction in the model, namely that there is uncertainty about demand or costs. In many markets, however, there can be uncertainty about both, and one would therefore need to examine their joint distribution. To analyse this in detail is beyond the scope of the present paper. One remark can nevertheless be made on the applicability of Proposition 1. Assume that the distributions are independent, and each satisfies (A1) conditional on the realisation of the other. For quantity competition the two sources work in the same direction ( 0 > i ρ from both the demand and the cost source), whereas with price competition it is necessary to examine the relative strength of two opposing effects ( 0 > i ρ from demand and 0 < i ρ from costs).
Empirical implications and tests of the predictions
The main finding -for empirical testing -was that only in the case of marginal cost uncertainty are the predictions on observable variables (prices, quantities, expected price-cost margins) independent of whether firms compete in "prices" or "quantities". For marginal cost uncertainty, competition between risk-averse firms is softer when firms are more risk-averse; have higher fixed costs; have lower accumulated profits; and the more background risk they face. In a more specific setting, with linear demand for differentiated products, more uncertain cost conditions (in the second order stochastic dominance sense) reduce the intensity of competition. For demand uncertainty, on the other hand, risk-aversion makes competition in prices fiercer, but softens quantity competition, i.e. empirical predictions can only be made conditional on the nature of competition. The issue is if the derived predictions are sufficiently sharp to have empirical content. It is argued that they are, and I will conclude by outlining some strategies to test the hypothesis that risk aversion influences the intensity of competition.
22
The above paragraph suggests that empirical tests should be directed towards markets with significant cost uncertainty. To identify those, a simple measure can be based on the ratio of the standard deviation to the mean for the most important input price. Alternatively, the amount of cost uncertainty should be inversely related to the possibility to predict the input price by time series methods (for example, in its most basic form, 1/R 2 from an AR (1) regression on the input price). Importantly, these two measures can be compared across industries and markets, as well as over time periods. To find corresponding measures that reflect demand uncertainty poses a greater challenge. In an inter-industry comparison, one is probably forced to treat the industries where there is demand uncertainty, but little cost uncertainty, as a control group for which theory gives no guidance. However, in an intraindustry study, with either geographical and/or time series variation, it might be possible to identify demand uncertainty by some intrinsically non-predictable variable such as weather conditions. But again, the predictions are conditional on the nature of competition in so far it can not be estimated.
To search for broad evidence of strategic effects of risk aversion it is useful to begin with inter-industry (Structure-Conduct-Performance) studies, despite their well-known limitations. First, some studies have tested if some measure of risk (often the standard deviation of historical profits) is correlated with profitability at the firm and industry level. In Schmalensee's (1989 p.973) survey, five studies report a positive, three an insignificant, and two a negative correlation. 25 To my knowledge, no study has attempted to split the sample according to the nature of uncertainty as suggested here. Second, a common finding in cross industry studies is that profitability is positively correlated with some measure of capital requirements in the industry, Schmalensee (1989 p.978) . This is often explained by the presence of entry barriers, as large capital requirement is a proxy for large minimum efficient scale. Risk aversion provides an alternative explanation -more fixed costs increase firms' risk aversion and thereby softens competition (except in case of demand uncertainty and price By shifting attention to intra-industry studies, it is possible to more directly test the hypothesis that risk aversion is a determinant of competition intensity. A large number of studies employ time series variation in costs and demand to identify a firm's (or a group of firms') behaviour by estimating a "conduct parameter", θ (see Bresnahan, 1989 , for a discussion and evidence from early studies, and Genesove and Mullin, 1998 , for a particularly instructive recent study). Under the hypothesis that risk aversion is important for firms' behaviour, θ should vary with the degree of uncertainty as well as with the amount of fixed In the paper it was also shown that strategic investments have additional effects when they increase fixed costs. Take the most straightforward case, where incumbent firms faced by the threat of entry can commit to unfavourable post-entry conditions by investing in capacity to reduce their marginal costs. Under the hypothesis that firms are risk-averse, such capacity investments may prove less effective since increased fixed costs also raise risk aversion and thus change post-entry competition. A prediction is that ceteris paribus uncertain cost conditions (measured by factor prices) makes it less likely that firms make strategic investments in capacity. The empirical evidence on strategic use of capacity is scarce, despite the strategy's intuitive appeal. For example, in Lieberman's (1987) seminal study of capacity investments in 38 chemical industries (where strategic investments should be effective if anywhere), only in a handful of cases did firms appear to use capacity in order to deter entry.
The limited evidence can be explained by risk aversion, but may also be attributed to several other factors (informational asymmetries, co-ordination failures among incumbents, freeriding problems).
It was shown that the intensity of competition is partly determined by firms' accumulated profits -firms being less willing to accept risks when their wealth levels are low.
One interpretation is that firms' wealth levels are low in when demand has been low for some time. By identifying such periods with recessions suggests that risk aversion will leave a trace in the intensity of competition over the business cycle. The implications are most easily illustrated when demand varies but in a predictable way such that only costs are uncertain.
After a period with low demand, firms' willingness to accept risk will be low, and this will soften competition in the sense that firms raise prices or reduce their quantities. Conversely, in booms competition among risk-averse firms will be fiercer with, relatively, lower prices or higher quantities. In markets with cost uncertainty, risk aversion thus produces a distinct pattern of prices and quantities over the business cycle. In particular, there will also be a counter-cyclical tendency in price-cost margins. However, the same statement can not be made for demand uncertainty without information on the nature of competition. This relates to a long ranging debate on whether the intensity of competition is pro-or counter-cyclical.
Some of the alternative explanations for why margins can have a counter-cyclical tendency include the temptation to deviate from implicitly collusive arrangements in booms (Rotemberg and Saloner, 1986) ; inflows of new customers in booms (Bils, 1989) ; and liquidity constraints in recessions (Chevalier and Scharfstein, 1996, and Gottfries, 1991) . The test of risk aversion against the set of alternatives would rely on differences in the pattern of margins over the business cycle between markets with significant cost uncertainty and others markets.
Appendix 1
First-order condition with (approximately) normally distributed profits and marginal profits
The purpose of this appendix is to provide an alternative formulation of a risk-averse firm's first-order condition that in some applications can prove more tractable. As shown in Section 2, the first-order condition can be written as
Compared to the main text, the new assumption is that The drawback of (A1.5) is, apart for its reliance on the normal distribution, is that
can't be used to compare the risk aversion generated by different concave utility functions, as shown by Kihlstrom et al. (1981) . To compare one needs to impose certain restrictions on the class of utility functions.
Appendix 2
This appendix shows, by way of a simple example based on (I1) and (I2) in section 3.1.1, that a SSD relation can be sufficient to make inferences on the best response functions. where the second equality follows from (A2.5). By partitioning (A2.6) 
